SOME ISSUES IN ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Sarkhel, Jaydeb
dc.date.accessioned	2016-12-23T00:23:47Z	-
dc.date.available	2016-12-23T00:23:47Z	-
dc.date.issued	2007
dc.identifier.issn	0973-5917
dc.identifier.uri	http://inet.vidyasagar.ac.in:8080/jspui/handle/123456789/969	-
dc.description	13 - 20	en_US
dc.description.abstract	The article first examines into a situation in which the seller of a product have better information about its quality than the buyers have. Then it has been seen how this kind of asymmetric information can lead to market failure. A model of quality choice is considered. The market for insurance service where buyers of insurance policies have better information than sellers of such policies has also been taken up. Then the problem of moral hazard is considered. In fine, signalling has been suggested as a solution to the problem of asymmetric information.	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.publisher	Vidyasagar University , Midnapore , West-Bengal , India	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Vidyasagar University Journal of Commerce;2007
dc.title	SOME ISSUES IN ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION	en_US
dc.type	Article	en_US
Appears in Collections:	Vidyasagar University Journal of Commerce Vol.12 [2007]

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