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Authors: Sarkhel, Jaydeb
Issue Date: 2007
Publisher: Vidyasagar University , Midnapore , West-Bengal , India
Series/Report no.: Vidyasagar University Journal of Commerce;2007
Abstract: The article first examines into a situation in which the seller of a product have better information about its quality than the buyers have. Then it has been seen how this kind of asymmetric information can lead to market failure. A model of quality choice is considered. The market for insurance service where buyers of insurance policies have better information than sellers of such policies has also been taken up. Then the problem of moral hazard is considered. In fine, signalling has been suggested as a solution to the problem of asymmetric information.
Description: 13 - 20
ISSN: 0973-5917
Appears in Collections:Vidyasagar University Journal of Commerce Vol.12 [2007]

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