Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://inet.vidyasagar.ac.in:8080/jspui/handle/123456789/6699
Title: Buddhist Conception of Time (kāla): A Critical Study
Authors: Biswas, Kuheli
Keywords: Impermanent (anitya)
time (kāla)
dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda)
niþsvabhāvatā (essencelessness)
śūnyatā (emptiness)
Issue Date: 25-Mar-2022
Publisher: Vidyasagar University , Midnapore , West Bengal , India
Series/Report no.: Philosophy and the Life-world;Vol 24 [2021-2022];;04
Abstract: In this article, I would like to present a critical examination of ‘time’ (kāla) as discussed in different Buddhist texts. The cyclical and recursive concept of ‘time’ (kāla) is the most important metaphysical question in philosophy. In western view, kāla exists apart from the concept of human mind. In Indian philosophy the concept of time (kāla) is the ultimate cause that governs the formation of and changes in all living things. It is also an all-pervading principle, which controls everything in it. Some thinkers believe that ‘time’ (kāla) is a permanent reality that controls the beginning and the end of the universe. In Vai÷eùika philosophy, ‘time’ (kāla) is the one, imperceptible and permanent substance and the cause of past, present and future. Upaniùad emphasizes on permanence with denial of change and causation. In Buddhist philosophy, time has been elaborately discussed in the Dharmasangani, the Milinda Panha and the Visuddhi Māgga in which the term (kāla) is impermanence regarding the concept of past, present and future with the aid of moment and event. According to early Buddhism, everything is impermanent (anitya), conditioned and dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) which is the causal law of the universe, as well as individual which leads the metaphysical view of time. Therefore, it has separate existence and there is mutual relation in present, past and future. Nevertheless, Mādhyamika philosophy denies the existence of time and proves the difficulties of admitting time in explaining contingence or relativity. Nāgārjuna denies not only svatotpattih, paratotpattiþ and ākasmikatāvāda of causal relation and reject change in the context of theories of identity and difference by the dialectic method. For him past, present and future have no own being and in this respect they are called ‘śūnya’(empty).
URI: http://inet.vidyasagar.ac.in:8080/jspui/handle/123456789/6699
ISSN: 0975-8461
Appears in Collections:Philosophy and the Life-world Vol 24 [2021-2022]

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