

## Philosophy of Grammar : Some Reflections

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**Abstract:** No language exists without grammar. Every language has a grammar isolated from which no language can perform communication. Grammar is practice and is concerned with the language we speak and write to communicate a sense. Thoughts cease to be so isolated from language, similarly, the latter will cease to be language and will disappear without grammar. *Accomplishment of communication is the justification in the matter of a grammar of some or other language. In this sense, grammar is the practice of the language that is based on and that can be deciphered in the light of the definitions for correctness or otherwise.* The paper is a thorough discussion on the issues of grammar and critically evaluates the popular Indian views against counter views from Western philosophers on the concept of grammar. It argues in favor of Grammar of the definition and the definable that is Pāninian aphorism and its utility in day to day uses of language.

**Keywords:** Transformational function, śabdānuśāsana, representationists, practice, garbs, āgama

Communication is eternal in the sense of beginninglessness and grammar makes it easy and successful. The basis of formation of Grammar is the sense of perpetually of flashes of consciousness that is language that infuses cognition and it is made possible on that foundation. Had language been fleeting or changing from moment to moment there would have been no incentive and, thus, attempt for formulating rules of language and then, reflection, analysis, translation, creating new garbs and their grammar would have not been possible. Muniraya, specially, Pānini sacrificed his life for perpetuating language. The Sanskrit term for grammar is *vyākaraṇa*, which literally means analysis and practice that includes grammatical and philosophical analysis as well. The analysis of indivisible knowledge into parts and interpretation of parts in an analytic and a synthetic scheme for making the indivisible understandable to beginners and ignorant persons are not possible without grammatical analysis. Since *Vaiyākaraṇas* accept the infusion of language and thought, the analysis of language is the analysis of cognition and vice versa<sup>1</sup>.

Language is not confined to uttering and hearing. The language we use for communicating consists of the expresser (*madhyamā śabda-* language as idea or flashing of consciousness)

and the manifester of the former that is, *vaikharī*- verbal noises/articulations and scripts. It comprises both it as the idea or thought object/concept for which we use the term ‘expresser’ and the verbal noises, written marks/gestures/signs and symbols for which we use the term ‘garb’. The former causes the incentive for the production of garbs in speakers and the garbs when heard in a sequence by audience manifest the former. Manifested so, the former reveals its own nature from which its meaning flashes forth non-differently. Memory like garbs serves as the cause of manifestation of language as thought. Since we are born in a language speaking community, the former can be revealed only through the spoken/read garbs of our proximity. Garbs, which, differ from community to community, are instrumental or tools in manifesting the former. Manifestation is not sufficient for the knowledge; manifested by the garbs the concept-language needs to reveal its own nature from which its meaning is revealed non-differently. Thus, the language and meaning it expresses are only objects that is intelligible beings to which our knowledge is confined. Language is the flashing of consciousness, a thought object/concept that can be analyzed artificially through the sequence of articulations and written scripts into parts for piecemeal understanding of the indivisible. Since language as thought is awareness in nature, it can flash its meaning non-differently and hence a theory of language infuses cognition settles the problem of non-difference of language and thought.

Grammar, for Pāinian system to which great philosophers like Patañjali and Bhartṛhari belong, consists of definitions laid down in *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and the object of those definitions that is *śabda* or language we speak and write for communicating. Pāini aphorism is the definition of Sanskrit language in particular. *Kātyāyana*, Patañjali and Kaiyama give a solid philosophical background to the aphorism and it in the hands of Bhartṛhari culminates as a philosophy proper of language and grammar for which our knowledge is not only based on but is confined to the intelligible beings of language and meaning.

No language exists without grammar. Every language has a grammar isolated from which no language can perform communication. Grammar is practice and is concerned with the language we speak and write to communicate a sense. As thoughts cease to be so isolated from language, similarly, the latter will cease to be language and will disappear without grammar. *Accomplishment of communication is the justification in the matter of a grammar of some or other language. In this sense, grammar is the practice of the language that is based on and that can be deciphered in the light of the definitions for correctness or otherwise.* we will discuss the point in precise after few paragraphs but beforehand, we think popular views of different Western philosophers on the concept of grammar must be discussed for a clear understanding of Indian views on grammar.

### **Controversy on the primacy of Language versus Grammar**

There is great similarity between the Indian view and that of some of the Western language philosopher's views on the understanding of grammar. On the issue of primacy Western philosophers are divided chiefly into two groups. Group first consisting of Wittgenstein, W.V. Quine and other Representationists gives primacy to language. For them, language is original and grammar comes later to systematize language through which form of life or intercommunication is made possible. Grammar is inseparable from language, and plays an important, continuing role in the thoughts of Wittgenstein. By grammar, he means first logic of language (Sprachlogik), in terms of logical form.

Wittgensteinians' view considers Grammar as divided into two parts, one of which is about the superficial or apparent structure of language/sentences, the other about the sentences' underlying structure. The surface structure is actually produced structure. It refers to the sentence as it is pronounced or written. The deep structure is the abstract structure that allows the native speaker of a language to know what the sentence means. It may then be said that the deep structure expresses the semantic contents of a sentence whereas the surface structure of a sentence determines its phonetic form. Transformation functions as a link between deep structure of sentences and their surface structures.

For Wittgensteinians, Grammar is a study of language usage through the logical structure of language, that is, logical syntax and semantics. My aim of analysis is different from the representationists of the West because, the object for my theory is neither an empirical phenomenon nor the thing-in-itself nor the logically constructed world of propositions and corresponding facts but the units of awareness or intelligible - beings that figure by the language. They are intelligible beings to which we understand through a logical structure of syntactical and semantic scheme. Our aim of discussing grammar is to understand the cognition as accomplished in communication.

It is interesting to understand Indian Grammar in terms of deep level and surface level as it is understood by Western Philosophers of language. However, if we have to understand it in those terms we can say that definitions and rules can be taken as deep level that serve as logical forms of language and the analytic and synthetic ways for understanding language are surface level grammar. But Pānini's aphorism is not just what Wittgenstein calls logical form of language but logical form of thought as well. What is the position of grammar that is primarily concerned particularly with spoken/ written form of language?

The theory discussed herein is based on the primacy of language. We will engage in with our observations of representationists account after this paragraph. The other group led by Noam

Chomsky<sup>2</sup> presumes grammar as the foundation of language; without grammar no language is possible. Grammar is the locus of creating every bit of language a child learns or speaks. It is inherited genetically, internal, innate or given form of language. A child is born with a perfectly programmed knowledge of universal grammar that he applies in learning language. He considers grammar at surface and deep level. Former level gives very little indication in itself of the sentential meaning while the later level generates language; it is the locus of language. Linguistic competence is acquired and developed on the basis of grammar and performance is manifestation of competence. Internal grammar is autonomous, it is not learnt but it makes learning of language possible. It is creative and is called by him as transformational generative grammar because through it innumerable sentences which have not been encountered before are generated.

Chomskian theory of knowledge by language can be well understood vis a vis Kantian frame of understanding. Kant understood mind as given categories that transform experiences into knowledge and Chomsky understood it as the given rules of grammar. The mind, for both, is given; it is innate for Chomsky and apriori for Kant and both accept it as creative. It is frame of forms that produces knowledge when the material is fed by sense-experience. Chomsky seems to replace Kantian forms of categories by his form of language that is the rules of grammar. Kant's purpose was to interpret knowledge as apriori –synthetic judgment and Chomsky's purpose was to make room for interpreting possibility of communication. However, Kant accepted that accomplishment of knowledge only by accepting categories and sense experiences and without accepting 'Unity of apperception' cannot be well interpreted. Knowledge is not a thing that can be understood arbitrarily by assuming a grammar part of mind; apart from the grammar part of brain, an agent (subject) and an object that figure in that knowledge are also involved. The subject cannot act on itself. It can transform, produce so many knowledge acts but can never be the object in knowledge. This statement is pertinent in regard with Chomskian view of grammar as the genetic part. The substratum of knowledge (genetic part) and the knowledge of the substratum are not the same. The empiricist philosophers of the West who accept brain as the bundle of the sensations derived from the senses and not as a part having the power of generating language may out rightly reject the idea of genetic or given creative part of the brain. The question of self –consciousness/awareness of the awareness by sentences requires a second part of brain but that in no way is solvable by genetic system because that is not a part of brain but the flash and its awareness as well. Knowledge is not produced and mind is not a factory of producing knowledge.

### **Language Embedded in Grammar Vis-a- Vis Grammar Embedded in Language:**

Consciousness is given but is known to us by the functions performed on its basis and the language as flash of consciousness is the cause of incentive to all conscious activities. Language, for the present theory, is the guide in the matter of knowledge. Language is not a slave of a Grammar; it is not embedded in Grammar but Grammar is embedded in language. Language is naturally fit to be analyzed and interpreted differently through different grammars. Grammar is practice and for it language as awareness and it as garbs comprising of verbal noises, written marks, gestures, sensations of or datum acquired by senses, through which the former form of language is communicated are equally important. These two aspects of language make our understanding of grammar different from all those who take language confined only to the latter. Being the flash, the former fold of language is indivisible and it is through the latter form that the indivisible is made understandable through the scheme of rules of analysis and synthesis.

It may be remarked that Chomsky's I-language and E-language can be understood similar to Bhartrhari's concepts of *sphoṭa* and *vaikharī* respectively. The former in respective theories is innate and the later is learnt. But I found radical differences between the two theories. Bhartrhari's *sphoṭa* unlike Chomsky's I-language is not just given as the genetic part or as given concept but is the thought, the flashing of its own nature and its meaning non-differently by it and, for this reason of being flash, it is called *sphoṭa*, the flash of consciousness that flashes only in present. The given may be psychological or physiological and, hence, an ontic entity but *sphoṭa* is not, it is not a metaphysical or ontic being but a cognitive/intelligible being; it is the flashing of consciousness and, hence, of awareness in nature. Similarly, *vaikharī* is not like the same what Chomsky says E-language that is learnt in a community; it cannot flash without the *sphoṭa* which serves as the cause of incentive to the production of utterances. Conclusively, it can be remarked that Chomsky's view is comparable to Bhartrhari on the issue of grammar only to the extent of differences.

### **Grammar is Practice**

Grammar is not confined only to Sanskrit language. Those who do not know the rules follow the practices of their community and accordingly they understand the correctness and incorrectness of the uses. To use and to know are different activities. If convention is the criteria of correctness of the uses then why do we observe it there with incorrect forms also? An illiterate person may communicate correctly but he does not know how his use is correct. How a word is used for a particular form and action and without knowing that the word is used by taking specific form or action into consideration, if one uses the word, there is always a possibility of craving incorrect form, which may corrupt the language and cause problem in communication. For these purposes knowledge of grammar is a necessity.

Those who do not know the rules of grammar also communicate and even without training in the discipline of grammar they by practice know the right course of uses. They distinctly know the right and wrong of those usages. How it happened so? For a common man it is convention and habit but for a philosopher, it is a cognitive problem. A response to this question requires the theorists' interpretation of the nature of language. The philosophers give a two-fold explanation of the nature of language. Those who accept language, as representation will not properly meet out the problem because the representation of a rule preexisting whether in mind or constituted of language is not possible. The reference theory of language cannot accept a rule prior to any referent and if the rule itself is accepted as referent then there will not be a room for the difference between the reference and referent. A reference cannot be a referent and simultaneous cognition of the two is impossibility. Rules are framed to help understanding of the referents in terms of references as well and it cannot be said that rules constitute the language but this condition is meaningful only for explanation. If there is language there is possibility of game of rules to make that understood in different ways. Language is awareness, foundational for the understanding of which we practice rules as a remedy for making the process of its learning easy.

The usage is followed through the traditional practices and that is grammar one learns by observation of its uses by the elders of the community. Even an ordinary person who does not know grammar knows distinctly if one is practicing incorrectly or correctly. For example, even an illiterate knows that  $2+2=4$  is right and any other conclusion out of that association is wrong. Four is on four in sequence that is after three. He knows that 4,3,1,2, is not a right sequence of counting the numbers and the sequence 1,2,3,4 is right because that is the practice. Thus, the observation of the uses is the grammar part of knowledge.

In the sense of practice, 'a' letter has a grammar because of which it is produced only from the specific places in the mouth and understood thus. Correctness of the uttering of the letter is identically known in all its occurrences and instances and similar is the case with a word and a sentence. Words are derived in different derivation for different meanings. It is grammar, on the basis of which, they are distinctly known as name, verb, particle, preposition, etc., which are derived into roots/stems, prefixes, suffixes, etc., and again they are divided into letters and their sequence. The sentences are divided into different words and are understood in the scheme of analysis as a unity of a word-meaning. Pāninian grammar is of the idea that we can determine the correct form and function of language on the basis of definitions. The meaning being non-different is determined with the determination of language.

The rule of language is the rule of meaning. In case of all these grammatical operations,

Pānini's aphorism are underlying definitions on the basis of which the correctness of language is determined. So far the meaning is concerned most of the Western philosophers base convention and context as the meaning giving elements. Different from them, convention for Pāninian tradition is included in grammar. Even in convention, the power of language as observed by Indian grammarians is natural fitness of the language to express meanings. The expressed meaning with some or the other similarity is imposed on intended meaning. Non-intended meanings are known by nearness of the expressive meaning of the language. Apart from literal meaning, Pāninians have written aphorism for determination of intended and non-intended meanings also.

**Grammar (Vyākaraṇa) is smṛti:** *Smṛtis* are written record of rules of language based on practices of the wise in a language speaking community, memory and indications from Veda<sup>3</sup> and, therefore, breakless continuity of the rules is preserved in it. Everybody follows what is good and what is bad<sup>4</sup>. Nobody can transgress the rule in a community regarding what is edible and what is not; eligible, non-eligible, correct and incorrect uses of the language or what is fit and meritorious and what is demeritorious in the matter of uses<sup>5</sup> are known by the practice based on definition. *Kātyāyana*, *Patañjali* and *Bhartṛhari* have similar opinion on these objectives of *Smṛti*. Issues of duty, practice of righteousness and morality, that is, *dharma* are included in it as the object which for them is a philosophy of life the tangible fruit of which is the knowledge of language and meaning and intangible fruit is freedom from all captives to our allegiances that is liberation.

Grammar, in human community, having concern with merit and demerit in usage, is considered as a discipline of virtue. Analysis of language into subordinate sentences, phrases, words and then words into substantives, verbs, prepositions, particles, post-positions, and then they into root/stem, suffixes, prefixes, and different kinds of nominative and verbal suffices and prefixes are means for understanding the indivisible. Grammar is given primacy among the six *vedāṅgas*, the first of the parts of Veda; one gets cultivated and achieves progress through it to realize Brahman, the highest principle.

In the tradition of Indian system of Grammar, knowledge is accepted neither as produced by someone nor as that emerged out of certain combination of body and mind. *It is the flashings; self-awareness of the object of awareness by which dharma (duty and righteousness) is known and that is one of the reasons that it is called Veda.* Like consciousness, Vedic sentences that are commandments, injunctions and prohibitions are uncreated (*apauruṣeya*). Practices of commandments and prohibitions of the Vedas in the human communities, serve like the seed in investigating and authoring *Āgama* after destruction of previously existing *āgama* and their

authors<sup>6</sup>. *Āgamas* are defined as *smṛtis*, which are written time to time; they are destroyed and after their disappearance they are written by the wise that practices Veda; *āgamas* are originated only in the one who practices Veda. In the absence of *āgamas*, worldly life runs with unwritten conduct of wise (*Dharmamaya*) whose consciousness is cultivated to the extent that flashes dharma. The passionate persons who blindly rush for the satisfaction of their desires cannot be the authors of scriptures (*āgama*). *Dharmamaya- puruṣa is a gentleman who knows duties, good and evil, merit and demerit of them and practices them with a view of justice to himself, his duties and the society; it is only those wise in whom there is excellence of knowledge and who after the disappearance or destruction of written records or scriptures (āgama) authors the āgama on the basis of indications from Veda and the observation of the Vedic practices in the society.*

Since the knowledge is not endowed naturally to any, authoring of the scriptures is necessary. The scriptures dealing with the prohibitions of vicious actions and injunctions of virtuous actions as the purpose are not ineffectual because the people take them authority in the matter of their practices. The duty is not effective in producing dharma by itself; it is scripture by which the merits and demerits of a duty are expressed and decided determinately. *Dharma* manifests only in a duty if the latter is in accordance with scriptures and any violation of which is evil.

*Vaiyākaranas* define ‘*vyākaraṇa*’ in following ways-

#### **Patañjali’s Definition of Grammar**

**i. Śiṣṭa prayogānuvidhāyī idam śāstram** - According to this *Dīpikā*<sup>7</sup> on *Mahābhāṣya*, to explain and interpret the correct form of the uses of language through analysis is the function with which ‘*vyākaraṇa*’ occupies itself. The scripture distinctly mentions that the power of merit and demerit is naturally attached there only with correct form of the language. Grammar (*vyākaraṇa*) is the elucidator of those forms. It is the cultivator of speech, the illuminator of correct forms of words and the eliminator of the incorrect forms<sup>8</sup>. The *Dharma* can dawn only in the persons who use the correct form of the word. By the correct form, we mean the form, which is beginninglessly used by the wise and is agreeable to the aphorism, that is, *Sūtras* of Pānini’s *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, and followed by *smṛtiyan*.

Corrupted forms (*apabhraṅśas*) of the word were also in uses of some communities but the *Vaiyākaranas* follow the time tested uses of the tradition of correct forms which were cultivated and systematized only by the Pānini *vyākaraṇa*. There may be many reasons for doing so. Out of those reasons we are giving here only the two. i. *vyākaraṇa* is an *Agama* and *āgamas* are based on the correct form of the words used traditionally since the time immemorial and ii.



Corrupted forms are not direct expressers<sup>9</sup>. The corrupted form of a correct form may be many and in that case any grammar of them will be difficult to survive. In case of use of corrupted forms the correct form of the word is expressed first and then, by the correct form of the word the meaning is expressed. Without the knowledge of correct form, we cannot determinately know a form corrupted.

In Western Tradition, Wittgensteinians<sup>10</sup> also accept that grammar is, properly speaking, a standard for the correct usage of linguistic expressions; it encloses all kinds of grammatical rules, such as rules of definition, analytical operation, and constitutive structure. Therefore, Wittgenstein speaks of “the grammar” of particular words, expressions, phrases, propositions, and even of states and processes. In Wittgenstein’s distinction between “surface” and “depth” grammar, the grammar is ‘strictosensu’ that aims merely at linguistic correction is surface grammar.

**ii. Lakṣyam ca lakṣaṇam caitatsamudītam vyākaraṇam bhavati**

Patañjali<sup>11</sup> has defined *vyākaraṇa* as the discipline concerning the object of definition, that is, language and the principles like aphorism of Pāṇini that defines the objects of definition or rules of uses of language. Language works through some rules-general and exceptions (*utsarga* and *apavāda*) and only through device (*laghutā*) of rules, we can know the wide world of language and its meaning. *The explanation comprising of analysis, interpretation including examples, counter examples, supplying of elision, etc., are employed in the sūtra because by eyes of aphorism alone, the words are defined, explained and their correct and incorrect forms are decided and that is why they are called lakṣaṇa (definition).*

*Lakṣaṇa* is restrictive by character; a general rule is formed by taking exceptions into consideration for which, Pāṇini has given aphorisms (*sūtras*) that bind the general for exceptional instances (*apavāda*). For example the sentence ‘serve curd to the brahmins’ is a general rule applicable to all Brahmins invited in a feast. But if Māṭhara (an individual) is suffering from fever at that time the exception statement ‘Māmharāyavinā’ binds the application of the general statement except ‘Māṭhara’. Fulfillment of merit and demerit, in regard to Pāṇinian tradition of grammar, is effected by the uses of correct and corrupt forms of language respectively. Technical words (*pāribhāṣika śabda*) were framed, the words were compartmentalized and divided, definitions were framed and the objections and exceptions were met out, the object to be defined namely the pronunciation, cultivation of tones exposed to audience, grammatical/syntactic analysis of root/stem, nominative, verbal, suffixes, prefixes, letters, words, sentences were exercised and corrected and corrupted forms of them were determinate to frame the aphorism

Because of the leading role *vyākaraṇa* performs, it is taken as the first among six parts of

the Vedas. They are *Vyākaraṇa*, *Chanda*, *Śikṣā*, *Kalpa*, *Nirukta* and *Jyotiṣa* the learning of which enriches one in the discipline of knowledge and cultivates the wisdom<sup>12</sup>. It is the branch of learning that occupies with the study of the knowledge of the correct forms of words/language and the uses of the correct form causes merit (*Dharma*) or cultural progress on the basis of which one achieves liberation.

In this sense grammar is understood in two ways.

**Grammar is the discipline of learning language and cultivating thoughts (*śabdānuśāsana*):**

i. Pānini and his commentator Patañjali, start with grammar as *śabdānuśāsana*<sup>13</sup>, meaning thereby instructing the beginninglessly used language by the cultured wise through piecemeal understanding of its nature and, hence, humanizing it for healthy practice. *Śabdānuśāsana* includes instruction of the general and exception rules through which the unlimited language having countless number of parts like different kinds sentences, compounds, words, stems/roots, suffixes and prefixes, can easily be made understandable in short period of one's life. It does not work like commands but as determiner or measure of examining correctness and incorrectness of the uses.

The question arises as to what is need of *Lakṣaṇa* text that is, Pānini aphorism of grammar is practice based on beginningless uses of the highly meritorious wise people (*śiṣṭas*). One can understand the definition formulated by wise as the definition of *vyākaraṇa* (*śabdā smṛti*) because of the reason that the uses of the *śiṣṭas* are not ignored by any. In the absence of definitions, the words may be used arbitrarily even by some wise and that even the wise people may also sometimes have confusion about the correct uses of the words and for these reasons these definitions are must. *Āgama* is the eyes for those meritorious who do not realize the correct uses of the words<sup>14</sup>. There are *śiṣṭas* who make uses independently of definitions and there are so many words for which there is no definition in Pānini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* but they are *śiṣṭa* or cultivated uses (*aśabdāsmṛti*) and are eternally correct and the correctness of them can be inferred as well. *vyākaraṇa* gives utmost importance to the practice of words by the wise (*śiṣṭas*).

**Purpose of Learning Grammar according to Patañjali**

Patañjali, has very specifically mentioned that grammar is studied for following purposes<sup>15</sup>-

- i. Preservation (*rakṣā*) of the Vedic language which may appear erroneous to them who know only the popularly spoken (*laukika*) language different from Vedic one.
- ii. Transformational cases where the substitution in lieu of some word in the text is proper for application (*ūha*). The *mantras* are not read there in all genders, numbers, tenses and case terminations. Even pronouns have to be changed in recitations by the names. Proper application

- of *mantras* in altering positions of agent, genders, numbers, suffixes, case terminations, space, time, etc., is required. One can make these changes only if he knows grammar.
- iii. Knowing ‘*Dharma*’ the proper meaning of which can be known only by the Veda with its six accessories (*vedāngas*), one should learn *vyākaraṇa*. It includes holy articulation of the correct forms of the words and the follow up of the oral/written tradition correctly as well.
  - iv. That is for brevity. The language reveals all even the finest shades of thoughts. As a number of vulgar equivalents are possible of a correct form of the words, it is for simplicity or brevity (*laghutā*) that they are to be known and instructed through grammatical rules. The words are innumerable; without knowing them in analytical scheme of roots/stems, suffixes, prefixes, etc., deciding their meanings universal or individual, expressive or suggestive separately and also in the set of a sentential- token so as to make the indivisible sentence and sentential meaning understandable in an analytical scheme, it is impossible to know all the words one by one in a short duration of a life.
  - v. Doubtlessness (*Asandeha*)-that is ascertaining the usage for firmness of knowledge. Misuse, improper and corrupted use of language cause confusion. The learning of grammar make us known about the proper use and thus checks the doubts that incur by the improper, inaccurate and defective uses of language that cause demerit. Only those who speak the same form of correct language become friends because friendship can naturally grow among the people of same level of thoughts and disciplined in communication or use of language.
  - vi. One of the major purposes of reading grammar, according to Patañjali, is to accrue similarity with the great deity immanent in all. To the knower of grammar, language reveals herself as a well-dressed wife desiring her husband would do<sup>16</sup>. The grammar should be studied in order that language could reveal herself to us. Grammar is the practice. To a knower of grammar, the goddess of prosperity (*Lakṣmī*) embraces herself.

### **Bharṭhari on Grammar-**

Bharṭhari in the first part of *Vākyapadīya* has written verses (11-22), has interpreted the ideas of three sages (*Munitraya*) of the tradition of *vyākaraṇa*, its problem, scope and purpose. We are providing herewith a summary of the verses because we think it will help the readers about knowing the meaning and worth of learning grammar from the original source.

Verse 11. Grammar is closest to Veda; it is foremost of trainings or austerities and is the most vital among the six parts of the Vedas. Learning grammar is difficult; it requires dedication, purposive labour, observation and practice and, thus, high of all other austerities like celibacy,

controlling over sleeping, sacrifices, etc. Grammar makes us know the tangible and intangible fruits of an action and accordingly distinguishes the merit in using the correct form and demerit by the corrupt form of the uses.

Verse 12. It is the ultimate essence of all the diversities and divisions of speeches or expressions and the direct means of knowing them. It is the light that illuminates not only lights but non-lights also. All are illuminated by language and that is the object of study of Grammar. The illuminating power of language because of which communication is accomplished is grammar. Grammar is the easy means for distinguishing correct usages from corrupt.

Verse 13. Language is the cause or the truth of the meaning because isolated from language no cognition, no meaning is possible. Nothing but grammar is the cause of knowing the truth of language. Only by grammar one can know the cultivated form of language, that is, the knowledge of the correct uses different from trivial or uncultured and corrupted uses that may make the communication difficult. The cultivation of the words by division and association of roots, stems, suffices, etc., the follow up of the traditional accents of the articulations and the derivation of rules for understanding different sorts of meanings of language with brevity and levity as per requirement of clarity is also called purification.

Verse 14. Grammar is the gateway to liberation. It is the cure of the ills of language; it is the purifier of all disciplines of learning. All disciplines of learning shine forth by taking refuge in grammar.

Verse 15. As all meanings (universals) are expressed by language similarly all disciplines of learning are dependent on grammar. Communication is the cognition by uses of language and those uses are Grammar. Without grammar, those uses cannot accomplish cognition in communication. It is because of grammar that the language communicates a particular sense.

Verse 16. Grammar is the first step to the ladder to wisdom (*siddhi*). It is the straight royal road to the aspirants of liberation. Grammar helps us in knowing the language, meaning and its relation; it is through it that we know the correct form of the uses and by following the pure form or correct uses one acquires merit. Liberation means independence from physiological, religious and cultural entities and our allegiances to them. Only in the purified mind the pure spiritual knowledge that is liberation dawns.

Verse 17. The wise, whose illusion concerning language and meaning is removed, realizes the true nature of his individual self as different from it made of sensory organs, motor organs, vital air, mind and intellect.

Verse 18. The indivisible light that is knowledge (*samvarta*), which is the supreme essence of speeches and which is diversified as the world of words and meanings (*vivarta*) is known through grammar.

Verse 19-22. The language as awareness is sequenceless which is understood as having sequence due to the articulated utterances; it is through it that indivisible is artificially divided diversely in the analytic scheme by grammar.

Language reveals meaning and the grammar makes the language and the meaning understandable in a grammatical structure. Language is the sole guide to the truth of the disposition of meaning and the knowledge of the truth of language is not possible without grammar and that is why knowledge becomes value. We decide its logic and use them for mapping logical structure of the language only after rules that are found there in practices in the correctness of which the aphorism is the guide. The language and the meaning are indivisible units because there is no possibility of divisions in unit awareness in nature.

Grammar makes the indivisible understandable in the whole and part scheme of analysis and synthesis. I agree with the representationists in so far as they talk about a transformational function but disagree to the point as a link between the two- the deep level and the surface level. Chomsky accepted genetic part of brain as a linking line of the two while Wittgenstein assumed the logical form. In Pāṇinian System there is no problem of linking. The two from speaker's point of view are related as the caused and the cause and from audience point of view as the manifest and the manifested. Manifested by the manifesters, the *sphoṭa* reveals its own nature. In all cases, the meaning is revealed by *sphoṭa* of which the garb is only tools in manifestation.

#### **Grammar & Critique of Laws of Thoughts:**

As I have pointed out earlier that for the philosophy of language discussed herein, the law of cognition is the same, the law of language that infuses the former. Since I have to make a statement about it, I have to put them first. Laws of thoughts in Aristotelian tradition are taken as different from the laws of language. They as have been observed by Aristotle follow thus- i. Law of identity- according to which A is A where A stands for any existence or property, ii. Law of excluded middle for which a thing may be either A or  $\sim A$  and iii. Law of non-contradiction, according to which, a thing cannot be A and not-A. No inference is possible if it ignores these laws. These Aristotelian laws are based on an observation of thought that is equally applicable to language and reality. If the reality, thought and language are different then inference plays a vital role in validity of cognition. Even it plays basic role in the perceptual cognition also as we find in

Buddhist's theory of perception as the source of valid knowledge. This inferential knowledge presupposes laws of thoughts as their general principle.

Aristotelian Laws of thoughts are grammar to the extent of inferential cognition only but we know that all cognition is not inferential. Unlike Aristotelian laws of thoughts, which are based on rule of proportion between language and thought, Grammarians believe in the law of non-difference between the language and thought. It is because of this law that the learning and analysis of language is exactly what is learning and analysis of thoughts. Moreover, if the two maxims firstly infusion of thought and language and secondly all cognition is direct flash of consciousness are accepted then we have to accept inferential cognition also as expressed by language presented in a syllogistic form. And only then it can be said that the rules of language are rules of thought and that thoughts as rules are true or are false. The objects of rules are revealed and hence serve as the cognitive ground or measure useful as the criteria of truth or falsity of inferences. Wittgenstein also agrees on the issue. According to Wittgensteinian although surface-grammar and depth-grammar cannot respectively be ascribed to a lower and higher rank as with traditional metaphysics, they cannot be separated because language and life form are interrelated. Therefore, a religious believer and a non-believer may use the same proposition, but the latter's meaning varies according to the different contexts of one's life form. Thus, the question of truth appears differently in different language games. For us, the context of life form, if it is something, is a vague and abstract entity. The reason for variation of different meanings is not the context of life form but what and how the language presents them. The context is neither an expresser nor an expressed but is ultra-virus. In Grammarian tradition knowledge is expressed and infused by language and, thus, the laws of thoughts are same the laws of language that expresses thoughts and that itself is a thought non-different from thought as its signification.

**Grammar is never an ideal:**

It is always the follow up of traditional practice of language for the understanding of which the rules are framed and taught. Not only that but also a word may be grammatically derived for a meaning and again for another meaning and the grammar helps us to decide as to what rule is in operation and what derivation is proper in a particular case. There is no concept of grammar isolated from language because that is not possible without language. The object (tattva) of grammar is language, which is called so, because of having a grammar. Grammar is practice and is not an ideal; it stands always practicable. The idea of transformational genetic grammar places grammar to an ontological status, which as such is philosophical. Grammar is the inseparable part of language because it is through it that language comes into the application and performs

communication.

### **Meaning and Grammar:**

Meaning is the object of language. It for us is not what is preconceived in a semantic system but that which is expressed non-differently by the language and thus, our view is different from the logical grammar of representationists like G. Frege and Wittgenstein for whom the meaning is the mode the fact is represented or more broadly, is the representational content of the logical language<sup>17</sup>. The cognition of language and meaning and the understanding of that cognition in the grammatical scheme are two different kinds of activities out of which the former is foundational to the latter. If the expression fulfills the accomplishment of communication, each and every expression has a grammar and the form of every word is correct if it is in line with the beginningless communication. The grammar of communication and the aphorism as the criteria of correctness do not differ. The knower of Pāninian aphorism can prove the correctness of the usages. The language we speak and write is perceived by the senses. The grammar pins down them as placed into practices of the language community and, thus, restrains arbitrary uses that may corrupt our thoughts.

No communication is possible if the language contradicts or fails to accomplish communication. We furnish grammatical rules for making a beginner understand the language by the grammar. We fit the understanding of language into the frame of certain rules by following which the language can correctly be learnt by the beginners. When we think of rules for the properly managed understanding of language, we analyze it in different parts. First of all, we find out the rules, for deciding what words of the language analyzed thus, stand for an agent, and what others for an action, an adjective, adverb, particle, preposition, post-position etc., and the association of what words constitute their syntactical synthesis as a sentence. We try to find out the rules for making understandable the particular mutual relation in between the several parts. There are exceptions and altering cases and then we follow instituted rules applicable for making the uses understandable through them. Words are differently derived into different roots/stems/suffices/ prefixes and thus enable the beginners learn them in a sequence.

Meaning is not grammar embedded but is infused eternally by language and that is why we study grammar not only to learn meaning but also to learn the language first. We agree with W.V. Quine that meaning is always the meaning of language but we disagree with him in so far he accepts that sentential- meaning is determined by the way we organize the language. The sentence in our system is a complete indivisible unit that is, sentence expressive of a complete sentential-meaning; independently of any association either with words or with word-meanings acquired by

grammatical analysis, the indivisible sentence expresses an indivisible sentential-meaning. No real division of a unit of awareness and, hence, any association of awareness is possible. The grammatical division and synthesis of the analyzed parts are artificial device to help the understanding of indivisible in a part-whole scheme. A word in a sentence has no independent meaning; it's meaning independently a sentential structure is universal and its compatibility is decided by grammar with the sentential meaning. The sentential meaning is particular. It is universal only in the sense of being manifested by several individuals (verbal noises and scripts spoken and written respectively in a sequence). It is particular in so far as it causes incentive for a particular action and universal as much as identical cognition is accomplished in its several occurrences and instances.

Semantic technique of Representationists for taking meaning, as a common element between language and the world, is a misleading idea because the former is a linguistic and the latter is material element of which the meaning, that is, the unit of awareness can be common only by proxy or can never be common. In the theory discussed herein, meaning is not an outcome of logical deduction or induction but non-different from language. The meaning is not fixed by convention but is expressed by language and the convention only specifies the meaning in terms of popular, intended and non-intended. It is not proper to accept that 'the grammar fixes the reference and then the word continues to function even when the reference does not exist' because the meaning is always the meaning expressed non-differently by language. Moreover, there will be no difference between grammar and convention but we obviously have even convention of grammar and vice versa.

### **Is Grammar Convention?**

All other schools of Indian philosophy except *vyākaraṇas* accept convention (*samaya*, *sanketa*, or *vṛddha-vyavahāra*) as *śakti* or *vṛtti*, that is, relation while *vyākaraṇas* do not define *śakti* as convention<sup>18</sup>. *Śakti* is the natural fitness of the language; it and so is its fitness to express its meaning is eternally there with language. The convention is the observation of the uses by elders. Elders use words in different ways, particularly for the popularly fixed meaning. None uses a word except for its popular meaning to a child below the age five. The understanding of a child for other meanings of the word the elders' use is developed later and even so after the understanding of the popular meaning first. He knows that the elders use the same word for other meanings of the word by an imposition of or by proximity with the popular/primary meaning. Apart from the primary and secondary or intended, the non-intended (*nāntarīyakārthas*) meanings, which are known by the nearness of the popular meaning of the word, are also the



meanings of the word. Thus, the observation of different sorts of uses of the word at different stages of *convention is a śakti different from relation; it delimits relation to specific meanings-expressive, intended and non-intended because of which the word is taken as expressive of all sorts of its meanings*. The convention merely delimits or specifies the relation to the observation of the uses by elders in different layers of primary, secondary and tertiary.

Indian philosophical systems discuss *Śakti* in relation to word only and not with sentences. *Grammarians accept sentences like words also as śakti (vācaka); they express the sentential-meaning. Any unit that may be a letter, a word or a sentence that expresses its meaning is śakti. By śakti, the language expresses its popular meaning which when imposed on some other meaning due to some similarity or even by opposition is intended meaning of the word and when some meaning close to the popular meaning is known it is non-intended meaning of the word. Herein, my use of language comprises of words and sentences and any other bit of language that satiates a complete sense.*

#### **Conclusion:**

We understand the language in a structure, similar formational and functional measures observed are equally applicable to group of words and sentences. Some of them are particularly applicable to Sanskrit language but are applicable generally to all languages. Grammar is definitions laid down in Pānini's aphorism which function for knowing language through rules of singling out the categories of words/sentences of syntactically similar genre, formation and specific distinctions and they help us know and identify the words in their nature, formation, derivation, function, etc. determinately and on the basis of which the correctness and otherwise of the uses are decided. *An use of the correct form of the language not only makes the oral tradition lively but also is taken as a royal road to liberation that is the spiritual goal of practices of language and grammar.* If we accept this criterion, we will be in a better position to say that the rules are given there with the language because of which even an uneducated and untrained in the discipline of language and grammar also communicate and distinguishes the correct from incorrect uses. The learned wise teaches the definitions to beginners for their piecemeal understanding of language which is the object of those definitions

#### **Notes & References**

1. *Vyākriyante vyutpādyante śabdaḥ*. The issue of infusion of language and cognition is discussed in

precise in the paper entitled ' Cognition, being and possibility of Expressions' by D.N.Tiwari, published in JICPR, Daya Krishna (ed.), New Delhi, Vol. XIV,No.1, 1996, pp.65-93.

2. *Pāniniśikṣā*, 6/7
3. Veda is the vision of seers. A seer is a wise who distinctly knows- i. what things are edible and what others or not (*bhakṣyābhakṣya*), ii. What woman is to be approached for sex and what others not iii. What is the import of an expression and what is not (*vācyāvācyā*), iv. What is tangible fruit of an action and what is intangible (*dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭā*). *Dharma* sports into him who possesses such distinctive knowledge and then he becomes receptive of the dawn of the Veda, that is, knowledge (*ṛṣayaḥ mantra dr̥ṣṭāraḥ*). These qualifications are equally required for the authors of *āgamas* (*bhakṣyābhakṣyagamyāgamyāvācyāvācyādivicayāvyaavasth-* itaḥ *smṛti* (Vākyapadīya 1/141.
4. *Ahitpratiṣedhārthānām hitapratipādanārthānām copadeśa śāstrāṇām..Harivṛtti* on VP.1/134
5. *Bhakṣyābhakṣyagamyāgamyāvācyāvācyādi viṣayaḥ vyavasthitaḥ smṛti*. *Harivṛtti* on VP.1/141.
6. *Ibid*-1/7 and *Harivṛtti* on it.
7. *Śiṣṭaprayogānuvidhāyī idam śāstram- Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, p.129.
8. *Sādhutvajñānaviṣayaḥ saīṣā vyākaraṇa smṛtiḥ, avicchedena śiṣṭānāmidam smṛtinibandhanam* ,VP.1/141
9. On the meaning of Apabhrāṣas Bhartṛhari has written verses Vp.1/147-152, according to which they express the correct form from which their meaning is expressed.
10. Wittgenstein on grammar, Wikipedia,
11. *Mahābhāṣyakāra* on *Vārtika 'lakṣyalakṣane vyākaraṇam'* of Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*
12. *Vidyābhedāḥ pratāyante jñānasanskāra hetavaḥ* -VP.1/10
13. Patañjali starts his *Mahābhāṣya* on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* with the aphorism '*śabdānuśāsanam*'.
14. *Śāstram cakṣurapaśyatām* VP.3/vṛtti *samuddeśaḥ* 79.
15. Patañjali in the Ist *āhnika* of *Mahābhāṣya* on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* points out the six purposes for which one must read *Vyākaraṇa*. See, *Rakṣohāgamalaghvasandehā*.
16. *Mahābhāṣyakāra* has quoted it from *Ṛgveda*. 10/71/4, in the Ist *āhnika*.
17. R.C. Pradhan : *Philosophy of Meaning & Representation*, D.K.Printworld (P) Ltd, New Delhi,1996.
18. See, *The Central Problems of Bhartṛhari's Philosophy* by the same author, ICPR,NewDelhi,2008,pp.393-394.